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Abstract:  
Our study examines the influence of institutional investors on firm investment 
efficiency based on the non-financial firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges over the 
period of 2009–2014. Our results show that institutional ownership generally improves 
firm investment efficiency. However, after considering the independence of 
institutional ownership, we find that only pressure-resistant institutional ownership 
increases firm investment efficiency by alleviating both over-investment and 
underinvestment. We also find that the pressure-resistant institution investors’ horizon 
matters. In particular, the pressure-resistant institution investors that have higher 
shareholdings are more stable, i.e. they tend to hold shares for a longer term, and thus 
have more intensive effect on firm investment efficiency. Our results also show that 
relaxing external financing constraints, reducing agency costs and increasing executive 
incentives significantly improve firm investment efficiency. The results are robust to 
controlling for endogeneity. Documenting the positive influence that pressure-resistant 
institutional investors have on firm investment efficiency and the channels through 
which they improve firm investment efficiency should be of interest to investors, 
regulators and academics. 
 









Making optimal investment decisions is the most important responsibility of senior 
management and also a fundamental issue in corporate finance. A firm's investment 
decisions and their outcomes determine the firm’s future cash flows and profitability, 
and have a profound effect on the firm’s long-term survival and growth (Liu et al. 2015). 
In a world free of market imperfection, any projects with positive net present value 
should be carried out, until the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of capital 
(Midigliani and Millar, 1958). However, due to various frictions in the real world, firms 
often deviate from making optimal investment decisions. Prior studies suggest that the 
main theoretical explanations for investment distortions are agency problems, i.e. the 
misalignment of managerial and shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986), and asymmetric information between corporate insiders and the capital 
market (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Under the agency theory and asymmetric 
information theory, managers can derive private benefits from building corporate 
empires. This motives the managers to engage in self-maximizing behavior and toward 
over-investment. Alternatively, when a firm needs to raise funds to finance an 
investment, managers might refuse to raise funds even if that means letting go of good 
investment opportunities, and therefore lead to under-investment. 
 
A large body of empirical literature supportive of both theories has investigated the 
determinants of firm investment efficiency. Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009) and Chen, 
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Hope and Wang (2011) suggest higher quality financial reports can mitigate information 
asymmetry problems, thereby improving investment efficiency. Gomarize and Ballesta 
(2014) find that firms with lower debt maturity are associated with both low over- and 
under- investment. Extending the findings that accounting conservatism improves 
investment efficiency (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith ,2011), Lara, Osma and Penalva 
(2016) document that accounting conservatism reduces under-investment via 
alleviating agency problems and mitigating firms’ financing constraints. In addition, 
some recent work provides evidence that ownership type impacts firms’ investment 
behavior and efficiency. Chen et al. (2014) examine the relationship between different 
ownership types and firm investment efficiency. They find that government and foreign 
ownership are associated with different level of agency problems and information 
asymmetry. They also find that foreign (government) ownership increases investment 
efficiency (inefficiency). Chen et al. (2011) also show that state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are associated with low investment efficiency and this effect is more 
pronounced when SOEs are politically connected through the employment of top 
executives with a government background. O’Toole, Morgenroth, and Ha (2016) 
discover that fully privatizing SOEs can improve capital allocation efficiency.    
 
Another strand of literature shows that institutional investors could alleviate conflicts 
of interest between managers and shareholders and influence corporate governance 
decision through serval channels including monitoring management, voicing their 
opinions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990) and threatening to 
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exit (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009). There is a large empirical literature on the 
relationship between institutional shareholders and firm performance (Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008; Elysiani and Jia, 2010; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach, 2017), earnings 
management (Kim, et al., 2016), corporate risk-taking (Diez-Esteban, et al., 2016), 
financial distress likelihood (Manzaeque, Merino and Priego, 2016), financial reporting 
and information disclosure (Velury and Jenkins, 2006; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012, 
Ding et al., 2013), innovation activities (Aghion et al., 2013), mergers and acquisitions 
(Andriosopoulos and Yang, 2015) and international equity investment (Roque and 
Cortez, 2014). It is not clear, however, what the role of institutional ownership plays in 
capital allocation. Therefore, we complement previous studies by exploring how the 
institutional ownership impacts firms’ investment behaviors and efficiency. Some 
previous studies suggest that not all institutional investors are equal, and different types 
of institutional investors can influence corporate governance and firm performance to 
different extents and in different ways (e.g. Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1998, Cornett, 
et al., 2007, Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Therefore, we also examine whether the type of 
institutional investor, i.e. pressure-resistant versus pressure-sensitive, has an impact on 
firm investment efficiency. In addition, we further examine how institutional ownership 
stability impacts the effect of institutional investors on investment efficiency, i.e. 
whether the effect of institutional investors on investment efficiency is increasing or 
decreasing with the institutional ownership persistence. As an extension of our research, 
we also attempt to identify through what channels institutional investors can affect firm 




For these purposes, we use Chinese publicly listed firm data for the period of 2009-
2014 to examine the relationship between institutional ownership and investment 
efficiency. Evidence from China is of particular importance given that China is the most 
populated country and the world’s largest emerging and transitional economy. The 
Chinese government has undertaken a series of important reforms to liberalize its 
capital market over the last two decades, such as opening the stock markets to qualified 
foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) and qualified domestic institutional investors 
(QDIIs), and launching the split-share structure reform. As a consequence, the 
institutional investors have been booming and playing an increasingly important role in 
the Chinese stock market1. Evidence shows that institutional investors can have positive 
effects in firms’ decision-making process and in promoting effective governance 
mechanisms (Aggarwal et al., 2011), especially in capital markets where the legal 
system is at a developing stage and the protections to shareholders are comparatively 
weak. In addition, although investment efficiency in China has improved over time, 
over- and under-investments are still a pervasive problem in Chinese firms (Ding, 
Knight and Zhang, 2016). On one hand, a World Bank report points out that 75% of 
listed non-financial firms in China consider financial constraints as the main 
impediment to their investment and growth. This is the highest rate among 80 countries 
that were investigated (Claessens and Tzioumis, 2006). On the other hand, investment 
spending has significantly surged over the last decade and an overcapacity problem has 
                                                             
1 The proportion of institutional shareholding in the markets has increased from 3% in 2004 to 33% in 2014 (Lin 
and Fu, 2017). 
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emerged in China (Lee, Syed and Liu, 2012). Overcapacity is not only in some 
traditional industries such as iron and steel, coal, glass, cement, aluminum, chemical, 
etc., but also in several emerging industries like solar panel and wind power generation 
equipment. According to Standard & Poor’s report (2013), China has the highest 
investment-to-GDP ratio and low investment productivity among 32 of the world’s 
largest economies over recent years - a sign of over-investment and deterioration in 
investment efficiency. The complex situation hinders Chinese economic development. 
Understanding institutional investors’ influence on firms’ corporate governance and 
investment efficiency in China may provide insights for understanding the roles 
different institutional investors play in settings of developing capital markets, and 
therefore, should be of strong interest to investors, regulators and academics.   
 
Our analysis yields three key findings. First, we find that institutional ownership is 
positively associated with firm investment efficiency, suggesting that institutional 
investors play an effective role in mitigating information asymmetry and agency 
problems, thereby improving investment efficiency. Second, when we disaggregate 
institutional investors into pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive groups, we find that 
only pressure-resistant institutional investors strongly enhance investment efficiency 
and this effect is more pronounced with high institutional ownership stability. Pressure-
sensitive institutional ownership does not show a significant effect on investment 
efficiency. The results suggest that pressure-resistant investors are more long-term 
focused, and thus are more concerned with a firm’s corporate governance and long-
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term development, and more active in monitoring and engaging with management to 
effect changes. Third, we find that pressure-resistant institutional investors increase 
firm investment efficiency through three main channels: (1) by alleviating external 
financial constraints; (2) by reducing agency costs; and (3) by executive incentive 
compensation plans.   
 
Our paper contributes to the corporate investment literature in three important ways. 
First, we contribute to the research by considering the influence of institutional 
ownership on firm investment efficiency. Second, our paper also contributes to the 
literature on the roles of institutional ownership in mitigating asymmetric information 
and agency problems. Our study considers the heterogeneity of institutional ownership 
from three dimensions including the size of institutional investors holding, 
independence and stability. In addition, our paper also explores the channels through 
which institutional investors affect investment efficiency, and provides a feasible path 
for firms to improve their investment decisions.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design with models, measure of variables 






2 Hypothesis development 
2.1 Institutional holdings and investment efficiency 
The extant corporate investment literature has documented that the information 
asymmetry and agency problems are the main factors causing inefficiency in corporate 
investment. Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that the information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders will affect the investment efficiency of an 
enterprise. Adverse selection and moral hazard can distort capital allocation function of 
the capital market, increase the cost of capital, and make it difficult for firms to raise 
funds for good investment opportunities. This leads to under-investment and entails a 
reduced firm value. Agency conflicts and information asymmetry exist when ownership 
and management separate. Shareholders can diversify their investment portfolios to 
eliminate unsystematic risk, and thus prefer to take riskier investment opportunities to 
maximize their return on investments. However, managers who have substantially more 
personal wealth tied up with one particular business are more risk averse. Managers, 
who know more about the value of a firm’s assets and the information about investment 
opportunities than shareholders, would be in a better decision making position to refuse 
to invest in a good project, due to their personal risk aversion nature and information 
asymmetry. For example, managers might be reluctant to invest in innovation, research 
and development activities and are more focused on recouping short-term benefits 
rather than long-term development. The divergence between shareholders and 
managers’ interests and the access to firm specific information makes managers 
“imperfect agents” who pass up good investment opportunities that would increase firm 
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value and shareholders’ wealth (Easterbrook, 1984).    
 
Managers also pursue their self-interest by overspending on investments that only 
negligibly benefit the shareholders or even at the cost of the shareholders. In scenarios 
such as liquidation, sell-offs, spin-offs, disinvestment, restructuring etc., shareholders 
can make better use of the money than managers who might use the money for “empire 
and reputation building” to gain remuneration for increasing firm size. Such investment 
in sub-optimal projects is for their own personal benefits rather than maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth (Jensen, 1986).  
Information asymmetry arises from conflicting interests between shareholders and 
managers, and makes it possible for “imperfect agents” to exploit shareholders. It can 
potentially damage the functioning of the capital market (Akerlof, 1970). Apart from 
the legal requirement that managers should fully and timely disclose relevant 
information, another potential solution to the information asymmetry is the involvement 
of information intermediaries in the capital market, who engage in accessing, 
processing and conveying management’s superior information to the market (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Institutional investors are an information intermediary that effectively 
improve firms’ disclosure quality (Shleifer and Visliny, 1997). Research shows that 
firms with greater institutional ownership and a long-term focus are more inclined to 
issue a forecast. Their forecast is more reliable with less biased optimism, and is more 
accurate, more detailed and more frequent (Ajinkya et al., 2005). Moreover, because of 
institutional investors’ active involvement in portfolio firms’ corporate governance and 
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their influence on managers’ decision making, they have lower costs to acquire and 
easier access to information, and consequently are at an advantage to the market in 
processing information. (McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016). It is documented that 
institutional investors are more active traders around information disclosures than other 
investors. The market gains information from institutional investors’ trading activities, 
which improves the information environment and reduces information asymmetry 
(O’Neill and Swisher, 2003). Evidence from the Chinese market also shows that share 
prices reflect institutional investors’ trading activities and captures valuable firm 
information (Hou and Ye, 2008; Lei et al., 2012). Their trading behaviours and their 
influence on other investors’ trading behaviours can significantly affect firms’ market 
performance and market value. Given institutional investors’ active involvement in 
corporate governance with managers, their effect on reducing information asymmetry, 
and the important role they play in the capital market, we argue that institutional 
investors can influence portfolio firms’ corporate governance in regard to investment 
decisions and investment efficiency. 
 
Institutional ownership also alleviates agency problems. Large institutional investors 
have incentives to monitor firms’ operations and influence the management by actively 
participating in governance-related activities in order to achieve higher returns (Maug, 
1998). Research shows that 63% of institutional investors choose to talk directly with 
the management or the board of directors of their portfolio firms. (McCahery, Sautner 
and Starks, 2016). Institutional investors’ involvement in corporate governance reduces 
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managers’ opportunistic self-interested and “window-dressing” behaviors, and 
effectively directs managers to focus on firms’ long-term performance and improving 
corporate governance (Hadani et al., 2011; Eaton et al., 2014; Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
In particular, institutional investors with large holdings significantly improve firms’ 
ability to innovate and induce management for the long-term (Aghion et al., 2013).  
 
Not only can institutional investors improve a firm’s governance and performance by 
actively participating in governance related activities, they can also improve a firm’s 
governance through a passive way - voting with feet. When it is less costly to sell their 
stake than correcting management failure, institutional investors would choose an exit 
strategy. The impact on share prices by institutional selling can influence management 
decisions (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009). Even if a manger is not concerned about the 
short-term stock price, the possibility that institutional investors disagree with the 
management and decide to exit the position improve the ability of an institutional 
investor to influence the managers (Levit, 2017). Parrino et al. (2003) document that 
institutional ownership significantly reduced in the year before a forced CEO turnover, 
which suggests that institutional investors “vote with their feet” when they are 
dissatisfied with management.  
 
Based on the discussion above, we argue that institutional ownership can have 
significant influence on reducing information asymmetry and alleviating agency 
problems, and therefore hypothesize that institutional ownership, which can influence 
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managers’ investment decisions, is positively associated with firm investment 
efficiency. Specifically, we form the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Institutional ownership can improve firm investment efficiency. 
 
2.2 The independence of institutional investor and investment efficiency 
Institutional investors vary in a number of dimensions. Their influence on management 
and corporate governance depends upon their investment horizons and their ties with 
management. With different incentives and conflicts of interests, institutional investors 
can be categorizes in to three categories based upon their relationship with management, 
that are, pressure-resistant institutions, pressure-sensitive institutions and pressure- 
indeterminate institutions (Brickley et al., 1988). The pressure-resistant institutional 
investors which have fewer business relationships with the portfolio firms have 
particular strong incentives to monitor management activities. Facing low conflicts of 
interests, they are more likely to vote against management on controversial issues. On 
the contrary, the pressure-sensitive institutional investors who want to protect the 
existing business or want to develop potential business relationships with their portfolio 
firms, are susceptible to pressures from management, and will passively play the 
shareholding role by either voting with the managers or holding shares without voicing 
their opinions on management decisions with which they disagree (Almazan et al., 2005; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011). The pressure-indeterminate institutional investors do not have 
business relations with the invested firms, however they are often categorized as 
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pressure-sensitive or passive investors due to the fact that they have small ownership 
and negligible monitoring effects on the invested firms. Therefore, we present the 
second hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2a: Pressure-resistant institutional ownership improves firm investment efficiency. 
H2b: Pressure-sensitive institutional ownership has no significant impact on firm 
investment efficiency. 
 
2.3 Institution holding period and investment efficiency 
Since pressure-sensitive institutional investors are susceptible to pressure from 
management and more agreeable to management decisions, such institutions’ 
shareholding and the length of the holding period has limited effect on corporate 
governance and investment efficiency. However, pressure-resistant institutional 
investors, with fewer business involvements with invested firms, are more independent 
and more active in monitoring and influencing management to effect change. With a 
long(er) holding period, pressure-resistant institutional investors are more concerned 
about a firm’s corporate governance and strategy and are more focused on a firm’s long-
term development rather than fishing short-term gains (Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, 2015). 
Moreover, the longer the holding period, the more reliable and more accurate 
information the institutional investors will learn about the portfolio firm, and 
consequently alleviates the information asymmetry between management and investors. 
Also institutions are more inclined to increase their holdings in portfolio firms which 
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they engage in monitoring on an ongoing basis. This shows institutional investors’ 
dedication and the incentives to monitor management and to influence corporate 
governance (Chen et al., 2007). Long-term institutional investors are important to 
financial markets, because of the magnitude of their holdings and the influence of their 
trading activities on household investors. Research shows that long-term institutional 
investors attract more analysts and thus effectively reduce information asymmetry costs 
(Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). Taking into account the different behaviors and holding 
periods of institutional investors, we propose: 
 
H3: The investment efficiency increases as the holding period of pressure-resistant 
institutional investors increases. 
 
3 Research design 
3.1 Variables 
Investment efficiency  
Following Biddle et al. (2009) and Shen et al. (2015), we define investment inefficiency 
as the difference between the actual and expected investments. Specifically, firms are 
considered to be over-investing (under-investing) if the actual investment is higher 
(lower) than the expected investment.  
 
We estimate the expected investment based on the investment expectation model 
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proposed by Richardson (2006), and use the residuals generated by the model to 
measure the investment inefficiency. The model is specified as follows:  
 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1
6 , 1 7 , 1 .
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t j j k k i t
INV TQ CF LEV RETURN SIZE
AGE INV IND YEAR
α α α α α α
α α η δ ε
− − − − −
− −
= + + + + +
+ + + + +∑ ∑
      (1) 
 
where i and t denote the firm i at year t. The dependent variable, INV, is the investment 
expenditure of firm i at year t, which is defined as the ratio of the sum of the yearly 
growth in fixed assets, intangible assets and construction work in progress to the total 
assets. TQ is Tobin’s Q as a proxy for growth and is calculated as the sum of the year-
end market value of common stocks and the book value of total debt divided by the 
book value of total assets; CF is the ratio of the operating cash flows to the total assets, 
LEV is leverage measured by the total debt divided by the total assets; RETURN is the 
annual stock return; SIZE is the size of the firm measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets; AGE is the number of listing years; RETURN is the annual stock return. We 
also control for industry (IND) and year (YEAR) effects on investment expenditure. The 
definitions and calculations for all the variables are presented in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The residuals from regression model (1) represent deviations from the expected 
investments. Following Gomariz and Ballesta (2014), our investment efficiency 
variable is measured by the absolute value of the residuals multiplied by -1, i.e.−�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�. 
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A higher value of −�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� indicates a lower deviation from expected investment, and 
thus a higher investment efficiency. The investment efficiency variable purely measures 
a firm’s investment efficiency level and does not differentiate between over- and under-
investment. To provide a more comprehensive assessment of firms’ investment 
behaviors, we also use the original residual values, ε, to measure over- and under-
investment in our empirical tests. A positive (negative) residual indicates that a firm 
invests more (less) than expected, an over-investment (under-investment). Table 2 
shows regression results generated by model (1). All variables are significant at the 1% 
level and the signs of the coefficients are consistent with prior research. The investment 
efficiency variable and the over- and under-investment can be calculated using the 
coefficients presented in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Institutional holdings   
We define total Institutional ownership (INST_ALL) as the percentage of ordinary 
shares of a firm held by institutions at the end of each financial year. The institutional 
investors include qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII), domestic mutual funds, 
social insurance funds, pension funds, insurance companies, trusts, banks, financial 
companies and other investment companies. As discussed previously, considering the 
different nature of institutional investors who have different business ties with their 
portfolio firms, we follow Brickley et al. (1988) and classify institutional investors into 
two groups, pressure-resistant (INST_PR) and pressure-sensitive (INST_PS) investors. 
Pressure-resistant institutional ownership (INST_PR) is defined as the percentage of 
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shares of a firm held by QFII, domestic mutual funds, and social insurance funds. 
Pressure-sensitive institutional ownership (INST_PS) is defined as the percentage of 
shares of a firm held by banks, insurance companies, trusts, and other types of 
institutional investor 2 . In addition, research shows that the institutional holding 
period/stability has a significant impact on corporate management and investment 
decisions. Long-term investors participate in management issues more actively than 
short-term investors, and their engagements are primarily motivated by long-term focus 
about firms’ corporate governance and development (McCahery et al, 2016). Therefore, 
following Elysaiani and Jia (2010), we use the institutional ownership persistence (IOP) 
proxy for institutional ownership stability, which is the ratio of the average ownership 
proportion to the standard deviation of the ownership proportion over a 5-year period 
(refer to Table 1 for details).  
 
3.2 Model 
We use the following model to test the three hypotheses proposed in section 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 ,
OPi t i t i t i t i t i t
j j k k i t
INVEFF INST I OREC FCF RMCOST
SIZE IND YEAR
β β β β β β
β θ χ ω
= + + + + +
+ + + +∑ ∑     (2) 
 
                                                             
2 Brickley et al. (1988) categorize institutional investors into pressure-resistant, pressure-sensitive and pressure-
indeterminate groups. Institutional investors such as pension funds, investment consulting firms etc. are considered 
pressure-indeterminate investors. These investors generally hold a small proportion of companies’ shares (less than 
one percentage) and are not actively monitoring firms’ management and thus have limited effect on a firms’ 
management. Therefore, we classify them as pressure-sensitive institutional investors for our research purpose. 
Ferrira and Matos (2008) categorize institutional investors as independent and grey institutional investors. Almazan 
et al. (2005) refer to them as active and passive investors respectively. 
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where INVEFF, as previously defined, measures investment efficiency which is 
obtained from the residuals from model (1). INST refers to total institutional ownership 
(INST_ALL) in the test for H1, and pressure-resistant (INST_PR) in the test for H2a and 
pressure-sensitive institutional ownerships (INST_PS) in the test for H2b. Based on our 
hypotheses, we expect the coefficients of INST_ALL, INST_PR and IOP to be positive 
and statistically significant. Following previous research, we also control for factors 
that can potentially affect investment efficiency. First, a higher major shareholders’ 
claimant (OREC) leaves less funds available for investment and leads to under-
investment. Research also shows that shareholders with high controlling ownership 
have more incentives and are more powerful in distorting firms’ investments to benefit 
themselves at the cost of expropriating minority shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Wei and 
Zhang, 2008). OREC is the ratio of other receivables to total assets, controlling the 
influence of major shareholders on investment efficiency. Second, the effect of free cash 
flow, FCF, is controlled, as ample cash provides more financial resources to 
investments and potentially alleviates under-investment problems, but also likely leads 
to over-investment problems (Richardson, 2006). Third, driven by self-interest, a 
manager’s investment decisions might harm a firm’s investment efficiency (Ang et al., 
2000). We therefore include the overhead expense ratio (RMCOST), the ratio of a firm’s 
operating expenses to its operating income, as a proxy for agency costs to control the 
agency effect on investment efficiency. Fourth, as previous studies find that larger firms 
have more access to resources to finance their investments, and are arguably more 
mature and more experienced in corporate governance and investments (Whited and 
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Wu, 2006), our model controls firm size (SIZE) effect on firm investment efficiency. 
We also include year and industry dummies to control the impact of macroeconomic 
change over time and unobservable industry heterogeneity. Table 1 presents a summary 
of the variable definitions. We estimate the model by OLS with clustering at the firm 
level. In addition to the OLS regression estimation, we also use the generalized method 
of moment (GMM) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimations to address the 
possible endogeneity problems as a robustness check (see section 4.3). 
 
3.3 Data 
Considering the influence of Split Share Structure Reform3 and the implementation of 
new accounting standards in 2007, our sample includes the A-share firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2014 excluding financial firms, 
special treatment (ST) firms and observations with missing data. This results in a 
sample of 8,372 observations. We winsorize all the continuous variables at 1% and 99%. 
Data used in this study are collected from the CSMAR database.  
 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
                                                             
3 Before the Split-Share Structure Reform (SSSR) took place in 2005, the Chinese government withheld control of 
the listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and owned non-tradable shares. Non-tradable shares, which are different 
from tradable shares held by public investors, are prohibited from being traded in the secondary market. Since the 
executives of SOEs were compensated based on the price of non-tradable shares, i.e. the book value of firm net 
assets, rather than the market value of the firm’s tradable shares, and were not able to benefit from any capital gains, 
they had no interest in the firm’s market value of equity, or the stock market risks faced by public investors. The 
introduction of the SSSR, however, which aims to convert non-tradable shares in to tradable shares, is expected to 
align the interests of state owners more with private owners, and to motivate executives of SOEs to improve a firm’s 




Table 3 presents sample descriptive statistics. The firm investment efficiency, INVEFF, 
has a mean (median) value of -0.0466 (-0.0299), and a standard deviation of 0.0643. 
Note in particular that the inefficient investment, ε, has a minimum (maximum) value 
of -1.7311 (0.7889) and a mean (median) value of 0.0002 (-0.0100). The statistics 
suggest that overall, over-investment is severe in China, although most of the 
observations under-invest over the sample period from 2009 to 2014, which is 
consistent with the findings in prior research (Xin et al., 2007; Gomariz and Ballesta, 
2014). There are about 7.7% shares held by institutional investors, of which 3.6% are 
held by pressure-resistant institutional investors and 4.1% are held by pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors. The pressure-resistant institutional ownership, with a standard 
deviation of 0.0428, is interpreted as a more stable ownership than pressures-sensitive 
institutional ownership which has a standard deviation of 0.0931. The stability of 
pressure-resistant institutional ownership, IOP, has a standard deviation of 1.7890, 
suggesting a substantial difference of holding stability among pressure-resistant 
institutional investors. The statistics of other variables summarized in Table 3 are to be 
similarly interpreted. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the main variables. While 
multicollinearity is a common issue in corporate governance research (Brown et al. 
2011), it is unlikely that multicollinearity is a major issue in our study, as the highest 
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correlations between variables included in the same regression is 0.383 between 
INST_PR and IOP. The correlations between the pressure-resistant institutional 
shareholdings, INST_PR, and investment efficiency, INVEFF, and the correlations 
between pressure-resistant holding stability, IOP, and INVEFF, are significantly 
positive as predicted. Neither the institutional shareholdings, INST, nor pressure-
sensitive institutional shareholdings, INST_PS, show significant relationship with 
INVEFF. The correlations suggest that percentage of shareholding by pressure-resistant 
institutional investors and a long and stable ownership are positively associated with 
firm investment efficiency, and pressure-resistant institutional investors tend to hold 
shares for a longer term. The agency costs (RMCOST) are significantly and negatively 
related to investment efficiency, suggesting high agency costs deter firms from optimal 
investments. Free cash flow (FCF) and firm size (SIZE) are significantly and positively 
related to investment efficiency. As expected, major shareholder claimant (OREC) 
shows a negative association with investment efficiency. However, the interpretations 
of the correlations table is only preliminary, we leave the formal interpretations of our 
results to the multivariate analysis.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4. 3 Main results 
Table 5 presents the results of model (2) that examines the relationship between 
institutional holdings, INST, pressure-resistant holdings, INST_PR, pressure-sensitive 
holdings, INST_PS, pressure-resistant holding stability, IOP, and firm investment 
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efficiency, INVEFF, respectively4. Column (1) shows that INST is positively related to 
INVEFF at 10% significance. In terms of economic magnitude, when total institutional 
holdings increase by 1%, investment efficiency will increase by 0.24% (0.011/0.0466). 
The results support H1 and suggest that institutional holdings improve firm investment 
efficiency, although we acknowledge that the test results presented in Table 5 do not 
indicate causal relationship, a point that we address later.  
 
Column (2) reports the relationship between INST_PR, INST_PS and INVEFF. The 
results show that INST_PR strongly enhances firm investment efficiency. Specifically, 
when pressure-resistant holdings increase by 1%, firm investment efficiency will 
improve by 1.09% (0.051/0.0466). The results capture the incremental effect of 
pressure-resistant ownership on investment efficiency, and suggest that pressure-
resistant institutional investors’ effective monitoring has a positive impact on firm 
investment efficiency. Hence H2a is supported. On the contrary, the pressure-sensitive 
institutional ownership does not show significant effect on investment efficiency. The 
results support H2b and suggest that pressure-sensitive institutional investors are likely 
to be agreeable to management, or their ownership is not strong enough to effectively 
influence the management’s decisions on investment.  
 
                                                             
4 We use the industry median value of institutional ownership to separate the sample into two groups. The group 
of firms with institutional ownership above the median are considered as high institutional ownership firms and 
those with institutional ownership lower than the median are considered as high institutional ownership firms.    
We also re-run the baseline regressions models based on two sub-samples. We find a significantly positive 
relationship between total institutional ownership (pressure-resistant institutional ownership) and investment 
efficiency for the firms with high institutional ownership. These findings echo our previous results from the full 
sample. The robustness test results are omitted for brevity but available from the authors upon request. 
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Column (3) provides the results of the influence of pressure-resistant holding stability, 
IOP, on investment efficiency, INVEFF. The results support H3 and show that the 
investment efficiency increases as the holding stability of pressure-resistant 
institutional investors increases. The significant relationship between stability and firm 
investment efficiency suggests that when institutional investors have a long-term 
investment in a firm, the institutional investors are more focused on sustainable long-
term development of the firm. This finding also supports the view that long-term 
investors are more engaged with effecting changes and disciplining management, as 
they are more concerned about the invested firm’s corporate governance and future 
growth rather than reaping the short-term gains from speculation (Bebchuk, Brav and 
Jiang, 2015).  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The results presented in column (2) and (3) in Table 5 motivate us to investigate further, 
as discussed in section 2.4, whether pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive 
institutional shareholdings and their stability alleviate either or both under- and over-
investment. We divide our sample data into two sub-samples, the under-investment sub-
sample, where εi,t<0, and the over-investment sub-sample, where εi,t > 0, and apply 
model (2) to both samples. Column (1) in Table 6 shows that, in general, institutional 
ownership can alleviate under-investment problems, and has no significant impact on 
over-investment. Column (2) shows that pressure-resistant institutional ownership can 
significantly alleviate both under- and over- investment, while pressure-sensitive 
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institutional investors do not show any significant association with either under- or 
over-investment. The results indicate that not all institutional ownership can improve 
investment efficiency. Pressure-resistant institutional investors who have less business 
ties with the portfolio firms are more likely to actively monitor management, induce 
changes and to promote a better governance and more efficient investments. Pressure-
sensitive institutional investors, however, are inclined to agree with managers’ 
decisions in order to protect the existing and potential business relations that they have 
with portfolio firms. They do not play an active role in governance, and are more 
reluctant to voice their opinions on managers’ investment decisions. Column 3 in table 
6 also shows that higher stability of pressure-resistant institutional ownership alleviates 
over-investment problems. Note that the adjusted R squares, the explanatory power of 
the models, are significantly higher for the under-investment models than the over-
investment models. The higher explanatory power of the under-investment models 
suggests that pressure-resistant institutional investors effectively reduce, in particular, 
under-investment problems. As discussed before, under-investment may be a result of 
agency conflicts, as managers, who have their careers, reputations and substantially 
more personal wealth tied up with one particular business, are more risk averse than 
investors, and are more likely to pass up good investment opportunities. The significant 
and negative associations between RMCOST and under-investment in Table 6 also 
support our agency costs interpretation.  
 
We notice that in Table 5 OREC is not significantly associated with investment 
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efficiency; however, OREC becomes highly significant in Table 6 after we distinguish 
over-investment and under-investment activities. The results support our argument that 
firms with a high OREC are more likely to have cash constrains, and are more likely to 
under-invest rather than over-invest. Turning to our other control variables, we find that 
free cash flow, FCF, significantly increases firm investment efficiency (as shown in 
Table 5), in particular by alleviating under-investment (as shown in Table 6). Finally, 
as discussed before, firm size plays a significant role in firm investment efficiency (as 
shown in Table 5). Large firms which have more access to funds, are less likely to have 
under-investment problems (as shown in Table 6). They are also less likely to over-
invest, as large firms are arguably more likely to have an established and mature 
governance mechanism to restrain over-investment. Our findings are consistent with 
prior research findings (Whited and Wu 2006, Deng and Zeng 2014). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.4 Endogeneity  
We acknowledge that endogeneity, particularly reverse causality and bi-directional 
causality, are potential concerns of our study, and may confound our tests. We conduct 
two additional tests to address such concerns. First, to explicitly address the reverse 
causality (where institutional investors are attracted to firms with high investment 
efficiency), we perform the Generalized Moment estimation Method (GMM), for which 
the natural logarithm of the market value of trading shares, CIRMV, and turnover rate, 
TURNOVER, are used as the instrumental variables for institutional ownership 
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variables. Prior research finds that institutional investors prefer investing firms with 
high market value, CIRMV, and low turnover rate, TURNOVER. However, CIRMV and 
TURNOVER are unlikely to directly affect firm investment efficiency, which satisfies 
the exclusion condition of instrumental variables (Hou and Ye 2008, Elyasiani and Jia 
2010). To provide additional support to our choice of instruments in the GMM test, we 
conduct the Sargan-Hansen over-identifying restrictions test to examine the exogeneity 
of the instrumental variables. Hansen J-statistics (p = 0.6827) suggest that at least one 
instrumental variable does not violate the over-identifying restrictions. The Kleibergen 
- Paaprk Wald F-statistic value is 399.685, rejecting the null hypotheses that the 
instrumental variables are weak and confirming the relevance of our instrumental 
variables to institutional ownership. Column (1) in Table 7 reports the GMM results. 
Consistent with the results presented in Table 6, pressure-resistant institutional 
ownership is significantly positively related to firm investment efficiency. The above 
analysis shows that our findings are supported after controlling the reverse causality. 
 
Second, in order to address bi-directional causality concern (where institutional 
investors improve firm investment efficiency which in turn attracts more institutional 
investors), we construct the following simultaneous equations (equations 3 and 4) and 
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The instrumental variables CIRMV and TURNOVER are included in equation (4)5. The 
regression results in Column (2) and (3) in Table 7 show that the pressure-resistant 
institutional ownership has a significant positive influence on firm investment 
efficiency, whilst firm investment efficiency does not show a significant influence on 
pressure-resistant institutional ownership. The results in Table 7 suggest that bi-
directional is negligible. The results are also consistent with prior studies and show that 
pressure-resistant institutional ownership has a significant positive correlation with 
CIRMV, and a negative correlation with TURNOVER (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010).  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 
4.5 Potential effect channels   
Our findings from the previous section support a causal relation between pressure-
resistant institutional ownership and firm investment efficiency. In this section, we 
explore the possible channels through which institutional investors exert impacts on 
firm investment efficiency. The most prominent frictions that lead to under- or over-
                                                             
5 We remove FCF from equation (4), as it has no significant relationship with institutional ownership, 
and provides noisier parameter estimates.  
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investment, as discussed previously, are information asymmetry and agency conflicts. 
In this section we specifically examine whether pressure-resistant institutional 
ownership can improve firm investment efficiency via mitigating information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts by 1) alleviating external financing constraints, 2) 
reducing agency costs, and 3) influencing executive incentive compensation plans.  
 
External financing constraints 
Due to the “imperfections” of capital markets, internal financing has multiple 
advantages over external financing. However, after exhausting internal financing 
options, firms raise funds externally. Due to information asymmetry, external funds are 
with high cost of capital and are likely to be insufficient, which potentially leads to 
under-investment (Fazzari et al., 1988). In addition, for firms with a debt over-hang 
problem, investment opportunities with a positive net present value may not be 
attractive to shareholders, given the additional risk involved. However, the rejection of 
good investment opportunities is against creditors’ expectations, and thus leads to 
under-investment problems and a further increase in the cost of debt financing (Myer, 
1977).   
 
Previous literature shows that institutional ownership can reduce information 
asymmetry between insiders and external investors, and thus reduce external financing 
constraints and cost of capital (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). It is also documented 
that institutional ownership effectively monitors portfolio firms’ financial structures 
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and reduces sub-optimal leverage. Particularly, the pressure-resistant institutional 
investors, which are less likely to have business ties with the portfolio firms, have more 
pronounced monitoring effects on firms’ leverage, especially, in an environment with 
high information asymmetry (Chung and Wang, 2014). Given the effects that pressure-
resistant institutional ownership can have on a firm’s financial structure and 
information and financing environment, we examine if pressure-resistant institutional 
investors improve firm investment efficiency via easing external financing constraints. 
Following Musso and Schiavo (2008), we use the enterprise credit characteristics to 
measure the degree of external financing constraints, or the ease of the access to 
external funds. The proxy for external financing constraints, EFC, is defined in Table 
1.  
 
Management efficiency  
Inefficient investment decisions may be driven by managers’ desire for self-
aggrandizement. On one hand, according to the agency theory, managers have the 
incentive to overspend for empire building with ample capital, which leads to over-
investment. On the other hand, managers are also expected to be risk-averse, as their 
prospects are generally tied to the single business they work for. One way for managers 
to reduce risk is to pass up risky opportunities, which would otherwise benefit 
shareholders (John et al., 2008).  
 
Inefficient investment, however, can be mitigated by increasing investors’ ability to 
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monitor managerial investment decisions. Institutional investors, given the size of their 
equity stake, long-term focus, and their engagement with management of portfolio 
firms, have motivation and ability to monitor and discipline managers’ opportunistic 
behaviors and improve investment efficiency. In particular, institutional investors’ 
threat of exit exerts pressure on managers, who are concerned about reputation 
enhancement, job security and any incentive payments that may emanate from 
shareholders’ confidence. Hence, institutional investors’ engagement with management 
to affect changes, and their exiting strategy to discourage managers’ self-interested 
behaviors, reduces agency costs and potentially increases investment efficiency. We 
therefore argue that the active role pressure-resistant institutional ownership plays in 
corporate governance can effectively improve investment efficiency through increasing 
management efficiency. Following Ang et al. (2000), our paper uses asset efficiency 
ratio to measure management efficiency and agency costs. The efficiency ratio, REV, is 
defined in Table 1.    
 
Executive incentive compensation plan 
Previous studies show that a well-designed executive incentive compensation plan can 
improve management efficiency, in particular, when keeping executive and shareholder 
interests integrated and aligned (Jensen and Murphy 1990, Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006). When managers’ remuneration and compensation heavily depend upon firm 
performance, managers may be tempted to spend on sub-optimal projects to achieve 
short-term performance goals by reducing, for example, R&D expenditure, which may 
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lead to negative long-term consequences.  
 
One way to address managers’ myopia is by linking managerial pay to shareholder value 
in the remuneration and compensation plan. Prior literature shows that when managers' 
compensation is linked to share price fluctuations, managers prefer riskier ventures with 
higher returns, which is in line with shareholders’ preferences (Coles et al., 2006). The 
effective use of a remuneration and compensation plan requires more careful design 
and greater influence and oversight from shareholders on investment decisions to 
minimize executives misallocating resources and gaming of reported performances to 
meet short-term goals. Institutional investors, given their involvement with 
management, are in a better position than household investors to influence a firm’s 
executive remuneration and compensation plan. Firstly, institutional investors with 
large shareholdings can nominate independent directors who have a significant 
influence on the compensation and appointment of executives. Secondly, institutional 
shareholders can induce their design and changes to a remuneration and compensation 
plan by using the threat of exit, making the plan more in line with shareholders’ interests 
(Hartzell and Starks 2003). Since an active institutional ownership can have a 
significant influence on executive remuneration and compensation to cater shareholders’ 
interests, we argue that pressure-resistant institutional ownership can improve firm 
investment efficiency via participating in designing and changing executive 
remuneration and compensation plans. The definition of EXEC, the proxy for the 




Given the mediation effects that external financing constraints, agency costs and 
executive incentive compensation plans can have on firm investment efficiency, we 
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Where external financing constraints, EFC, agency costs, REV, and the executive 
incentive compensation plan, EXEC, are the mediator variables, MEDIATOR. For 
equation (5), if β1 is greater than 0, it shows that pressure-resistant institutional 
ownership enhances firm investment efficiency. If θ 1 and φ2 are significant while φ1 is 
insignificant, then the mediator variable has a full mediation effect. If either one of θ 1 
and φ 2 is insignificant, we need to examine the mediation effect of the mediators by 
using the Sobel-Goodman test. 
 
The results are presented in Table 8. Column (1) and (2) provide regression results by 
using external financing constraints, EFC, as the mediator variable. The coefficient of 
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INST_PR in Column (1), generated by equation (6), is highly significant and greater 
than zero, showing that pressure-resistant institutional ownership reduces the external 
financing constraints. The coefficients of INST_PR in Column (2), generated by 
equation (7), becomes insignificant when EFC is added to the regression, suggesting 
that the external financing constraint has a full mediation effect. The Sobel-Goodman 
mediation effect test shows that z = 8.591 which is significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that the effect pressure-resistant institutional ownership, INST_PR, has on firm 
investment efficiency, INVEFF, can be attributable to pressure-resistant institutional 
investors, effectively reducing a firm’s external financing constraints. 
 
Column (3) and (4) provide regression results using the agency costs, REV, as the 
mediator variable. The coefficient of INST_PR in Column (3), generated by equation 
(6), is highly significant and greater than zero, suggesting that pressure-resistant 
institutional ownership significantly improves management efficiency. The coefficients 
of REV and INST_PR in Column (4), generated by equation (7), are highly significant 
and greater than zero, showing management efficiency partially mediating the 
relationship between pressure-resistant institutional ownership and investment 
efficiency. The Sobel-Goodman mediation effect test shows that 16.40% of the effect 
that pressure-resistant institutional ownership, INST_PR, has on firm investment 
efficiency, INVEFF, is attributable to the management efficiency. 
 
Column (5) and (6) report regression results using the executive incentive compensation 
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plan (EXEC) as the mediator variable. In Column (5), the coefficient of INST_PR, 
generated by equation (6), was significant and greater than zero, showing that pressure-
resistant institutional ownership significantly increases the alignment between 
managerial pay and shareholder interests. The coefficients of EXEC and INST_PR in 
Column (6), generated by equation (7), are also significant and greater than zero, which 
shows that executive incentive plays a partial mediating role between pressure-resistant 
institutional ownership and investment efficiency. The Sobel-Goodman mediation 
effect test shows that 19.16% of the effect that pressure-resistant institutional ownership, 
INST_PR, has on firm investment efficiency, INVEFF, is attributable to the executive 
incentive compensation plan. While prior literature documents the roles that 
institutional investors play in influencing portfolio firms’ executive remuneration and 
compensation schemes (e.g. Hartzell and Starks 2003), we do not empirically test the 
influence of different activities they participate in on the schemes in this study. We leave 
a more thorough examination to future research. 
 
4.6 Additional tests 
In order to take in to account the different natures of institutional ownerships, we use 
various kinds of institutional ownerships as the explanatory variables to test the 
influences that they may have on firm investment efficiency. Our untabulated results 
show that domestic mutual funds and social insurance funds, which are the pressure-
resistant institutional ownerships, significantly improve investment efficiency; while 
bank holdings significantly decrease investment efficiency. We also find that insurance 
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company holdings, trust holdings and financial firm shareholdings are negatively 
related to firm investment efficiency; while non-financial firm shareholdings and 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) holdings are positively related to firm 
investment efficiency. However, the relationships are not statistically significant. Note 
that QFII does not show a significant relationship with firm investment efficiency, 
suggesting China’s QFII does not significantly influence firms’ investment decisions. 
In general, the results support the previous findings that pressure-resistant institutional 
ownership can have a significant positive impact on firm investment efficiency.  
 
In addition, to test the robustness of our results on over- and under-investment, we sort 
the value of the residuals, ε, generated by model (1), from high to low and equally 
divide them into three groups. We remove the middle group which contains firm-year 
observations with negligible deviations from the expected investment expenditure, and 
keep the top and bottom groups which contain firm-year observations with the highest 
and lowest residuals, respectively. Therefore, over-investment (under-investing) occurs 
in the top (bottom) group. The untabulated results based on this new classification are 
consistent with the results presented in Table 6. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we empirically examine the influence of institutional ownership on firm 
investment efficiency. We find that first, institution ownership in general, improves the 
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firm investment efficiency; second, after considering the business ties institutional 
investors have with the portfolio firms, we find that only pressure-resistant institutional 
investors, who are more independent and have less business ties with the portfolio firms, 
improve firm investment efficiency by alleviating under- and over-investment problems; 
while the pressure-sensitive institutional investors, who are more dependent on the 
business relationship with the portfolio firms, do not have a significant influence on 
firm investment efficiency. Third, after considering the influence of the holding period 
of pressure-resistant institutional ownership, we find that pressure-resistant institutional 
investors’ long-term focus increases portfolio firms’ investment efficiency. In addition, 
when pressure-resistant institutional investors hold portfolio firms’ shares for a longer 
term, they tend to increase the size of their shareholdings. Last, we find that alleviating 
external financing constraints, increasing management efficiency, and influencing 
executive incentive compensation plans, are important channels for pressure-resistant 
institutional investors to improve portfolio firm investment efficiency. 
 
Our findings shed light on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
investment efficiency. We add to this strand of literature by disaggregating institutional 
investors into different types depending on their impediments to engagement, 
principally because of the protections to the existing or potential business relationships 
with the portfolio firms. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical literature on 
agency theory and information asymmetry, and help investors, regulators and 
academics understand institutional investors’ behaviors and strategy that can be used to 
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align management interests with shareholder value, and monitor management to 




Admati, A., and P. Pfleiderer. 2009. The ‘‘Wall Street Walk’’ and shareholder activism: 
exit as a form of voice. Review of Financial Studies 22 (7): 2645-85. doi: 
10.1093/rfs/hhp037. 
Aggarwal, R., I. Erel, M. Ferreira, and P. Matos. 2011. Does governance travel around 
the world? Evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 
100 (1): 154-81. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.018. 
Aghion, P., J. V. Reenen, and L. Zingales. 2013. Innovation and institutional ownership. 
American Economic Review 103 (1): 277-304. doi: 10.1257/aer.103.1.277. 
Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The association between outside 
directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings 
forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (3): 343-76. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-
679x.2005.00174.x. 
Akerlof, G., 1970. The market for ‘lemons’: quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 629–650. 
Almazan, A., J. C. Hartzell, and L. T. Starks. 2005. Active institutional shareholders 
and cost of monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation. Financial 
Management 34 (4): 5–34. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-053X.2005.tb00116.x. 
Ang, J. S., R. A. Cole, and J. W. Lin. 2000. Agency cost and ownership structure. 
Journal of Finance 55 (1): 81-106. doi: 10.1111/0022-1082.00201. 
Bebchuk, L., A. Brav, and W. Jiang. 2015. The long-term effects of hedge fund activism. 
Columbia Law Review 115 (5): 1085–156. doi: 10.3386/w21227. 
Bergstresser, D., and T. Philippon. 2006. CEO incentives and earnings management: 
evidence from the 1990s. Journal of Financial Economics 80 (3): 511–29. doi: 
10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.011. 
Biddle, G. C., G. Hilary, and R. Verdi. 2009. How does financial reporting quality relate 
to investment efficiency? Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (2-3): 112–31. 
doi: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.09.001. 
Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease, and C. W. Smith. 1988. Ownership structure and voting on 
antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 267–91. doi: 
10.1016/0304-405X(88)90047-5. 
Brown, P., W. Beekes, and P. Verhoeven. 2011. Corporate governance, accounting and 
finance: A review. Accounting and Finance 51 (1):96–172. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
629X.2010.00385.x. 
Chen, X., J. Harford, and K. Li. 2007. Monitoring: Which institutions matter?. Journal 
of Financial Economics 86 (2): 279–305. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.09.005. 
Chhaochharia, V., A. Kumar, and A. Niessen-Ruenzi. 2012. Local investors and 
corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54 (1): 42-67. doi: 
10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.03.002. 
Chou, J. L., L. Ng, and Q. H. Wang. 2011. Are better governed funds better monitors? 
Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (5): 1254–71. doi: 
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.008. 
Chung, C. Y., and K. N. Wang. 2014. Do institutional investors monitor management? 
Evidence from the relationship between institutional ownership and capital 
39 
 
structure. North American Journal of Economics and Finance 30: 203-33. doi: 
10.1016/j.najef.2014.10.001. 
Coles, J. L., N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2006. Managerial incentives and risk-taking. 
Journal of Financial Economics 79 (2): 431-68. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004. 
Cornett, M. M., A. J. Marcus, A. Saunders, and H. Tehranian. 2007. The impact of 
institutional ownership on corporate operating performance. Journal of Banking 
and Finance 31 (6): 1771–94. doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.08.006. 
Ding, R., W. X. Hou, J. M. Kuo, and E. Lee. 2013. Fund ownership and stock price 
informativeness of Chinese listed firms. Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management 23 (3): 166-85. doi: 10.1016/j.mulfin.2013.03.003. 
Ding, S., J. Knight, and X. Zhang. 2016. Does China overinvest? Evidence from a panel 
of Chinese firms. The European Journal of Finance 3:1-23. doi: 
10.1080/1351847X.2016.1211546. 
Eaton, T. V., J. R. Nofsinger, and A. Varma. 2014. Institutional investor ownership and 
corporate pension transparency. Financial Management 43(3):603-30. doi: 
10.1111/fima.12045. 
Easterbrook, F. H., 1984. Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. American 
Economic Review 74(4), 650-59.   
Elyasiani, E., and J. Y. Jia. 2010. Distribution of institutional ownership and corporate 
firm performance. Journal of Banking & Finance 34 (3): 606-20. doi: 
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.08.018. 
Fazzari, S., K. G. Hubbard, and B. C. Petersen. 1988. Financing constraints and 
corporate investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 141-95. doi: 
10.2307/2534426. 
Gallagher, D. R., G. Smith, and P. L. Swan. 2007. Institutional investor monitoring and 
the structure of corporate boards. SSRN Working Paper. 
Gillan, S., and L. Starks. 2007. The evolution of shareholder activism in the United 
States. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 19 (1): 55-73. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-
6622.2007.00125.x. 
Goergen, M., and L. Renneboog. 2001. Investment policy, internal financing and 
ownership concentration in the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance 7 (3): 257–84. 
doi: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00022-0. 
Gomariz, M. F. C., and J. P. S. Ballesta. 2014. Financial reporting quality, debt maturity 
and investment efficiency. Journal of Banking & Finance 40: 494-506. doi: 
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.07.013. 
Hartzell, J. C., and L. T. Starks. 2003. Institutional investors and executive 
compensation. Journal of Finance 58 (6): 2351–74. doi: 10.1046/j.1540-
6261.2003.00608.x. 
Hadani, M., M. Goranova, and R. Khan. 2011. Institutional investors, shareholder 
activism, and earnings management. Journal of Business Research 64 (12): 1352–
60. doi: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.12.004. 
Healy, P.M. and Palepu, K.G., 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and 
the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of 




Hirschman, A. O. 1970. Exit, voice, and loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
American Economic Review 76 (2): 323–29. 
Jensen, M., and K. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top management incentives. 
Journal of Political Economy 98 (2): 225-64. doi:10.1086/261677. 
Jiang, L., J. B. Kim, and L. Pang. 2011. Control-ownership wedge and investment 
sensitivity to stock price. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35 (11): 2856–67. doi: 
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.03.017. 
John, K., L. Litov, and B. Yeung. 2008. Corporate governance and risk taking. Journal 
of Finance 63(4): 1679-728. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x. 
Kyle, A. S., and J. Vila. 1991. Noise trading and takeovers. Rand Journal of Economics 
22(1): 54-71. doi: 10.2307/2601007. 
Lee, I. H., S. Murtaza, and X. Liu. 2012. Is China over-investing and does it matter? 
IMF Working Paper Series No. WP/12/277.  
Levit, D. 2017, Soft shareholder activism, SSRN Working Paper. 
Liao, L., Liu, B. and Wang, H. 2014. China’s secondary privatization: Perspectives 
from the Split-Share Structure Reform. Journal of Financial Economics. 113:500-
518  
Liu, Y., M. K. Miletkov, Z. B. Wei, and T. Yang. 2015. Board independence and firm 
performance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance 30: 223-44. doi: 
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.12.004. 
Mackinnon D P, Lockwood C M, Hoffman J M, et al. A Comparison of Methods to Test 
Mediation and Other Intervening Variable Effects. Psychological Methods, 2002, 
7(1):83 
Maug, E., 1998. Large shareholders as monitors: Is there a trade-off between liquidity 
and control? Journal of Finance 53 (1): 65–98. doi: 10.1111/0022-1082.35053. 
McCahery, J. A., Z. Sautner, and L. T. Starks. 2016. Behind the Scenes: The Corporate 
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors. The Journal of Finance 71 
(6):2905–32. doi: 10.1111/jofi.12393. 
Mclean, R. D., T. Zhang, and M. Zhao. 2012. Why does the law matter? Investor 
protection and its effects on investment, finance, and growth. Journal of Finance 
67(1): 313-50. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01713.x. 
Morck, R., B. Yeung, and W. Yu. 2000. The information content of stock markets: why 
do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? Journal of 
Financial Economics 58 (1-2): 215–60. doi: 10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00071-4. 
Musso, P., and S. Schiavo. 2008. The impact of financial constraints on firm survival 
and growth. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 18 (2): 135-49. doi: 
10.1007/s00191-007-0087-z. 
Myers, S. C., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial 
Economics 5 (2): 147–75. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0. 
Myers, S. C., and N. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when 
firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 
41 
 
13 (2): 187–221. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0. 
O’Neill, M. and Swisher J. 2003. Institutional Investors and Information Asymmetry: 
An Event Study of Self-Tender Offers. The Financial Review. 38:197-211.  
Parrino, R., R. W. Sias, and L. T. Starks. 2003. Voting with their feet: Institutional 
ownership changes around forced CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 
68 (1): 3–46. doi: 10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00247-7. 
Ramalingegowda, S., and Y. Yu. 2012. Institutional ownership and conservatism. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (1-2): 98-114. doi: 
10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.06.004. 
Richardson, S. 2006. Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of Accounting Studies 
11: 159-89. doi: 10.1007/s11142-006-9012-1. 
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of 
Finance 52(2): 737–83. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x. 
Velury, U., and D. S. Jenkins. 2006. Institutional ownership and the quality of earnings. 
Journal of Business Research 59 (9): 1043-51. doi: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2006.05.001. 
Wei, K.C.J., and Y. Zhang. 2008. Ownership structure, cash flow, and capital investment: 
evidence from East Asian economies before the financial crisis. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 14(2), 118–32. doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.02.002. 
Whited, T. M., and G. J. Wu. 2006. Financial constraints risk. The Review of Financial 




Table 1: Variable definitions 
INV The ratio of the sum of the yearly growth in fixed assets, intangible assets and 
construction work in progress to the total assets. 
TQ Tobin Q: the sum of market value of tradable shares, book value of non-tradable 
shares and liabilities divided by book value of total assets  
CF The ratio of the operating cash flows to the total assets 
LEV Leverage：total liabilities divided by total assets  
RETURN Stock performance: adjusted buy-and-hold market returns measured over year t  
SIZE Firm size：natural logarithm of total assets  
AGE Firm age：Sample year minus list year plus 1 
ε Inefficient investment： regression residual generated by equation 1 
INVEFF Investment efficiency：the absolute value of equation 1 regression residual 
multiplied by -1 
INST Institutional ownership：percentage of number of ordinary shares owned by 
institutional investors 
INST_PR Pressure-resistant institutional ownership： percentage of number of ordinary 
shares owned by pressure-resistant institutional investors 
INST_PS Pressure-sensitive institutional ownership：percentage of number of ordinary 
shares owned by pressure-sensitive institutional investors 
IOP The stability of pressure–resistant ownership type6 
FCF Free cash flow： Net profit plus interest expense and non-cash items less the 
increase in working capital and capital expenditure, scaled by total assets  
OREC large shareholder claimant：other receivables scaled by total assets  
RMCOST Overhead expense rate：overhead expense divided by operating income 
EFC External financing constraints7 
REV Revenue： total revenue scaled by total assets  
EXEC Executive incentive：Dummy variable and it equals to 1 when the firm-year 
observation implements executive incentives plan and 0 otherwise 
CIRMV Natural logarithm of market value of equity 
TURNOVER Annual turnover /the total number of tradable shares  
IND Industry dummy variables: according to CSRC classification standard, 17 industry 
dummy variables are included to control for unobservable industry effects. 
YEAR Year dummy variables which are included to control for macroeconomic changes 
over time. 
                                                             













，QFII holding and SECURITY holding is 
calculated similar to fund stability. Pressure resistance type institutional ownership persistence (IOP) is the mean 
value of the fund, QFII shareholding and shareholding sustainability of social security. The greater the IOP, the 
higher stability, i.e. the longer term shareholdings. 
7  Following Musso and Schiavo (2008), Yang (2012) and Luo and Chen (2012), we use enterprise credit 
characteristics and select five variables/dimensions to measure external financing constraints. The five 
variables/dimensions are firm size, net tangible assets to total assets ratio, solvency, liquidity ratio, debt to asset ratio 
and return on assets. For each of these five variables/dimensions, and each year, we rank the values/ratios from low 
to high and place the value/ratio in one of the quintiles. Then we calculate the average score of the five dimensions. 
A higher score, EFC, implies an easier access to external funds. 
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Table 2: Regression results of expected investment model 
 
TQ i,t-1 CF i,t-1 LEV i,t-1 RETUR
N i,t-1 
















Table 2 reports correlations on variables that determine firm-year expected investment. See Table 1 for variable 
definitions. The signs of *,** and*** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of main variables 
 
Variables N Mean Sd Min Med Max 
INVEFF 8372 -0.0466 0.0643 -1.7310 -0.0299 0.0000 
ε 8372 0.0002 0.0794 -1.7311 -0.0100 0.7889 
INST 8372 0.0771 0.1020 0.0016 0.0462 0.5840 
INST_PR 8372 0.0357 0.0428 0.0000 0.0197 0.1950 
INST_PS 8372 0.0412 0.0931 0.0000 0.0104 0.5510 
IOP 7947 1.2830 1.7890 0.0000 0.9840 15.9300 
OREC 8372 0.0171 0.0289 0.0000 0.0085 0.5850 
RMCOST 8372 0.0925 0.0921 0.0017 0.0726 2.1350 
FCF 8372 0.0004 0.1230 -2.7290 0.0149 3.0480 
SIZE 8372 22.1800 1.2800 19.2900 22.0200 25.7500 





Table 4 Correlation matrix 
 
 INVEFF INST INST_PR INST_PS IOP OREC RMCOST FCF SIZE 
INVEFF 1         
INST 0.014 1        
INST_PR 0.032*** 0.407*** 1       
INST_PS 0.000 0.903*** -0.020* 1      
IOP 0.025** 0.124*** 0.383*** -0.043*** 1     
OREC -0.007 -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.027** -0.007 1    
RMCOST -0.096*** -0.026** -0.0100 -0.024** 0.052*** 0.113*** 1   
FCF 0.132*** -0.045*** -0.019* -0.040*** 0.003 -0.036*** -0.033*** 1  
SIZE 0.082*** 0.046*** -0.026** 0.063*** -0.014 -0.085*** -0.343*** 0.027** 1 
Notes: Table 4 reports Pearson correlations for main variables. See Table 1 for variable definitions. The signs of *,** and*** denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
46 
 
Table 5: Institutional holdings and firm investment efficiency 
 
 INVEFF 
 (1) (2) (3) 
INSTi,t 0.011*   
 (1.78)   
INST_PRi,t  0.051*** 0.034** 
  (3.21) (2.03) 
INST_PSi,t  0.003 0.005 
  (0.51) (0.84) 
IOPi,t   0.001** 
   (2.32) 
ORECi,t -0.026 -0.023 0.003 
 (-0.73) (-0.67) (0.09) 
RMCOSTi,t -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.040*** 
 (-2.77) (-2.76) (-2.61) 
FCFi,t 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070** 
 (2.94) (2.94) (2.43) 
SIZEi,t 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (4.69) (4.69) (5.49) 
Constant -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.121*** 
 (-7.31) (-7.39) (-8.47) 
YEAR control control control 
IND control control control 
N 8372 8372 7947 
F 26.60*** 25.60*** 23.67*** 
Adj_R2 0.067 0.068 0.060 
 
Table 5 reports the regression results for the effect of institutional holdings on firm investment efficiency. See Table 
1 for variable definitions. Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are included in the model. The sign of *, ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are used to address issues of heteroscedasticity and correlated error 




Table 6：Institutional holdings and over-/under-investment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 εi,t<0 εi,t>0 εi,t<0 εi,t>0 εi,t<0 εi,t>0 
INSTi,t 0.016*** -0.007     
 (2.58) (-0.61)     
INST_PRi,t   0.066*** -0.059** 0.057*** -0.031 
   (3.71) (-2.17) (3.15) (-1.06) 
INST_PSi,t   0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.003 
   (1.15) (0.25) (1.11) (-0.24) 
IOPi,t     0.000 -0.001* 
     (0.70) (-1.93) 
ORECi,t -0.123*** -0.189*** -0.120*** -0.191*** -0.107** -0.213*** 
 (-2.67) (-3.80) (-2.61) (-3.83) (-2.36) (-3.36) 
RMCOSTi,t -0.061** 0.039 -0.060** 0.039 -0.030* 0.051* 
 (-2.34) (1.58) (-2.34) (1.57) (-1.91) (1.72) 
FCFi,t 0.102*** -0.014 0.102*** -0.014 0.111** -0.012 
 (2.73) (-0.77) (2.73) (-0.77) (2.36) (-0.63) 
SIZEi,t 0.005*** -0.002** 0.005*** -0.003** 0.005*** -0.002* 
 (6.36) (-2.23) (6.33) (-2.32) (8.63) (-1.85) 
Constant -0.134*** 0.124*** -0.135*** 0.130*** -0.147*** 0.119*** 
 (-7.46) (4.86) (-7.49) (5.04) (-9.70) (4.51) 
YEAR control control control control control control 
IND control control control control control control 
N 5032 3340 5032 3340 4733 3214 
F 22.68*** 12.58*** 21.84*** 12.05*** 22.20*** 11.01*** 
Adj_R2 0.145 0.053 0.147 0.053 0.138 0.051 
Table 6 reports the regression results for the effect of institutional holdings on over-/under-investment. Firms with 
an ε <0 are in the under-investment group; firms with an ε > 0 are in the over-investment group. See Table 1 for 
variable definitions. Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are included in the model. The sign of *, ** and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are used to address issues of heteroscedasticity and correlated error 
terms across firms and/or across time.
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Table 7: The influence of institutional ownership on firm investment efficiency based 
on GMM and 3SLS estimations  
 
 GMM 3SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 INVEFF INVEFF INST_PR 
INST_PRi,t 0.174*** 0.460***  
 (3.18) (7.90)  
INST_PSi,t 0.002 0.004  
 (0.29) (0.66)  
INVEFFi,t   -0.039 
   (-0.76) 
ORECi,t 0.031 -0.003 -0.053*** 
 (0.90) (-0.13) (-3.32) 
RMCOSTi,t -0.050*** -0.060*** 0.007 
 (-2.75) (-7.00) (1.14) 
FCFi,t 0.067*** 0.072***  
 (2.84) (12.39)  
SIZEi,t 0.003*** 0.001  
 (4.74) (1.61)  
CIRMVi,t   0.009*** 
   (15.93) 
TURNOVERi,t   -0.000 
   (-0.20) 
Constant -0.112*** -0.095*** -0.156*** 
 (-7.88) (-6.33) (-9.91) 
YEAR control control control 
IND control control control 
Hansen J 0.167   
(p-value) (0.6827)   
Wald F 399.685   
Table 7 reports the GMM and 3SLS regression results for the effects of institutional holdings on firm investment 
efficiency. See Table 1 for variable definitions. CIRMV and TURNOVER are instrumental variables. The predicted 
value of INST_PR (INST_PR^) is used in place of INST_PR when INVEFF is the dependent variable. Year fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects are included in the model. The sign of *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered at the 




Table 8: Mediation effect tests  
    MEDIATOR=EFC      MEDIATOR=REV           MEDIATOR=EXEC 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 EFC INVEFF  REV INVEFF  EXEC INVEFF 
EFCi,t  0.008***       
  (5.13)       
REVi,t     0.005***    
     (3.12)    
EXECi,t        0.004** 
        (2.36) 
INST_PRi,t 3.540*** 0.021  0.329*** 0.049***  1.356*** 0.046*** 
 (20.72) (1.49)  (2.76) (3.09)  (13.75) (2.92) 
INST_PSi,t  0.003   0.002   0.004 
  (0.53)   (0.36)   (0.64) 
ORECi,t -2.909*** 0.001  0.320* -0.025  -0.107 -0.023 
 (-11.52) (0.03)  (1.88) (-0.71)  (-1.04) (-0.65) 
RMCOSTi,t -0.097 -0.054***  -1.917*** -0.046**  0.0420 -0.055*** 
 (-1.12) (-2.74)  (-10.01) (-2.08)  (1.10) (-2.77) 
FCFi,t -0.318*** 0.074***  0.168*** 0.070***  0.054** 0.071*** 
 (-4.39) (3.03)  (4.03) (2.89)  (2.26) (2.93) 
SIZEi,t 0.018*** 0.003***  -0.008 0.003***  -0.004 0.003*** 
 (2.89) (4.55)  (-1.43) (4.73)  (-1.49) (4.72) 
Constant 2.387*** -0.136***  0.852*** -0.121***  0.045 -0.116*** 
 (16.13) (-7.86)  (6.15) (-7.49)  (0.65) (-7.40) 
YEAR control control  control control  control control 
IND control control  control control  control control 
N 8372 8372  8372 8372  8372 8372 
F 56.49*** 25.30***  111.7*** 25.43***  38.40*** 24.71*** 
Adj_R2 0.125 0.075  0.282 0.069  0.099 0.068 
Sobel test 8.591（p=0.00）  4.546（p=0.00）  3.357（p=0.00） 
Sobel-Goodman   16.40%  19.16% 
Table 8 reports the recursive regression results for the mediation effects of EFC, REV and GGJI, on firm investment efficiency via 
pressure-resistant institutional ownership. See Table 1 for variable definitions.  Year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are 
included in the model. The sign of *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are used to address issues of heteroscedasticity and 
correlated error terms across firms and/or across time. 
